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Abstract
The limited number of existing papers that link competition among microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) and microcredit interest rates, provide inconclusive and coun-
terintuitive results. This paper uses data from 1997 MFIs operating in 109 coun-
tries between the years 2003 and 2016 to construct three measures of competition 
and evaluate their impacts on interest rates. These measures reflect three different 
aspects of competition: geographical expansion, market concentration, and the 
marginal pricing. While the results for market concentration are inconclusive, the 
results for both geographical expansion and marginal pricing show an economically 
strong impact of competition on interest rates. Specifically, regardless of whether 
an MFI is a for-profit or nonprofit, we find meaningful evidence that competition 
reduces interest rates. Our findings evince that lower interest rates are needed if 
the microfinance movement is to continue to be relied on as an effective means to 
alleviate poverty.
Keywords Microfinance · Competition · Lerner Index · Microcredit interest rates · 
For-profit MFIs
JEL Classification D4 · G12 · G23 · F31 · F63
 * Moh’d Al-Azzam 
 malazzam@qu.edu.qa
 Christopher Parmeter 
 c.parmeter@miami.edu
1 Department of Finance and Economics, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
2 Department of Economics, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA
 M. Al-Azzam, C. Parmeter 
1 3
1 Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate under significant financial constraints. 
They serve the unbankable, face high risks of default, provide small loans, oper-
ate in remote areas, use labour intensively, and strive to reduce reliance on sub-
sidies to achieve financial sustainability. As such high interest rates for MFIs 
are perceived to be inevitable. However, the impact of high interest rates on the 
poor has become a widespread concern. Problems associated with high interest 
rates include the reduction of both borrowers’ surpluses and the demand for, and 
uptake of, microfinance services, inability to keep up with interest payments, 
over-indebtedness, exacerbation of financial burdens, social stresses, and the 
reduction of the overall well-being of borrowers. Rosenberg et  al. (2009), Van 
Rooyen et al. (2012), Dehejia et al. (2012), and Sinclair (2012) conclude that high 
interest rates are one of the central reasons why MFIs may fail to ensure the well-
being of the poor and serve as a poverty alleviation tool.
Classical economics asserts the importance of competition in markets as an 
alternative to government intervention through, for example, interest rate ceilings 
(Helmes and Reille 2004; Miller 2013). In general, competition is believed to 
promote allocative and productive efficiency, which leads to lower costs of micro-
credit. While the initial movement of microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool 
has received substantial support from non-government organisations (NGOs), 
donors, social investment funds, and subsidies, the increase in profit opportuni-
ties has gradually moved microfinance into the provision of financial services to 
the poor on a commercial basis. With commercialisation comes competition that 
was deemed inevitable following the entrance of for-profit MFIs and the continu-
ing transformation of many NGOs into for-profit MFIs. Competition is gradually 
becoming an important facet of microfinance (Porteous 2006).
Unlike typical industries, there exists a mixture of for-profit and nonprofit 
MFIs. While for-profit MFIs seek to maximise profit, nonprofit MFIs tend to 
maximise social objectives such as serving the poorest population, maximising 
outreach to borrowers, and empowering women. For-profit MFIs may compete 
among each other to maximise profits and nonprofit MFIs may compete among 
each other to maximise social objectives. Despite this, one common objective of 
both for-profit and nonprofit MFIs is to maximise the number of borrowers (even 
though for-profit MFIs may target more reliable borrowers). How interest rates 
are set by for-profit and nonprofit MFIs may have important consequences on the 
number of borrowers served. In addition, corporate social responsibilities of for-
profit MFIs may induce them to compete with nonprofit MFIs in providing loans 
at concessional rates for health, education, and housing purposes. While studies 
on the impact of competition on microfinance in general remain very limited, the 
impact of competition on interest rates has been further overlooked.
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm would predict that MFIs with 
more sources of monopoly power would engage in anticompetitive behaviour, 
such as charging higher interest rates (Bain 1956). In this, a competitive envi-
ronment in microfinance may contribute to the promotion of allocative and 
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productive efficiency, which lowers cost and interest rates. One side of the argu-
ment is that competition may lead to lower standards of screening and monitor-
ing, increased asymmetry of information, a weaker MFI–borrower relationship, 
multiple loan taking, over-indebtedness, and high default rates (McIntosh and 
Wydick 2005; McIntosh et  al. 2005; Vogelgesang 2003; Schicks and Rosen-
berg 2011; Assefa et al. 2013; Bardsley and Meager 2012). If defaults on loans 
rise, then MFIs may respond by increasing interest rates. The theoretical impli-
cations of de Quidt et  al. (2018) suggest this direction. They find that competi-
tion reduces MFIs’ use of joint liability, which in turn reduces repayment rates, 
increases interest rates. However, higher interest rates may affect the riskiness of 
the pool of loans by crowding out safer borrowers or by inducing borrowers to 
invest in riskier projects, both of which may lower profits of the MFIs. Therefore, 
MFIs may reduce the number of loans given and introduce stricter credit stand-
ards instead of increasing interest rates (Stiglitz and Wiess 1981). Consequently, 
the impact of competition on interest rates is not definite.
The empirical studies that examine the impact of competition on interest rates 
have reached inconclusive and counterintuitive results. Baquero et  al. (2018) 
examine the impact of competition on interest rates and portfolio quality for both 
nonprofit and for-profit MFIs using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. The authors 
find that in less concentrated markets, for-profit MFIs charge lower interest rates and 
have better portfolio quality and that nonprofit MFIs are insensitive to changes in 
market concentration. Mersland and Strøm (2009) construct a measure of competi-
tion based on the challenge of competition as perceived by the MFIs and conclude 
that interest rates respond positively to higher levels of competition. Depending on 
the profit status of the MFI and using the number of MFIs active in each country 
in 2009 as a measure of competition, Roberts (2013) finds that competition among 
nonprofit MFIs reduces interest rates, while competition among for-profit MFIs 
increases interest rates.
Studies that evaluate the impact of competition on interest rates are lacking in 
various aspects. First, evidence on competition in microfinance is scarce. Second, 
the results of these studies are strongly inconclusive. One main reason for this might 
be the adoption of a single measure of competition in each of these studies. In addi-
tion, the various measures considered may not necessarily reflect intensity of com-
petition and potential market power of the MFIs. Third, the literature reveals little 
on the impact of competition among for-profit MFIs and nonprofit MFIs on interest 
rates. The current results on the impact of competition among for-profit MFIs and 
nonprofit MFIs and that more competition increases interest rates seem to strongly 
contradict the structure-conduct-performance. Fourth, a structured analysis of the 
extent to which competition prevails and how it affects interest rates is still quite 
limited.
This paper considers the impact of three distinct measures of competition on 
interest rates using data collected from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
(MIX) from 1997 MFIs between the years 2003 and 2016. These measures are based 
on the geographical expansion through the use of the number of branch offices of an 
MFI relative to the total number of branch offices of all MFIs in the country, market 
concentration based on a gross loan portfolio, and the difference between price and 
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marginal cost (i.e. the Lerner Index). These measures give different signals on the 
evolution of competition over time. Although the results for market concentration 
seem to be inconclusive (but consistent with the nascent literature), the results for 
the number of branch offices and the Lerner Index show a consistent impact of com-
petition on interest rates; specifically, increased competition reduces interest rates 
charged by for-profit and nonprofit MFIs.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect. 2 presents the data. Section 3 outlays the 
empirical model, explains the variables used, and develops alternative measures of 
competition. Section  4 presents the estimation methods, and Sect.  5 presents the 
results and discussion. Finally, Sect.  6 presents several concluding thoughts and 
offers policy recommendations.
2  Data
There are more than 3000 MFIs reporting to the MIX Market. Data for MFIs date 
back to 1999. The MIX Market classifies MFIs into diamonds according to the avail-
ability and quality of data provided by the MFIs. Diamonds range from 1 to 5 where 
a higher number indicates more transparent and reliable data. To evaluate the overall 
impact of competition, all MFIs are included regardless of their classifications. To 
address the quality and availability of data, MFIs with three or less diamonds are 
also used, and the subsequent results were essentially the same. Data on macroeco-
nomic variables and interest rate ceilings are gathered from the World Bank and 
Naimbo and Gallegos (2014), respectively.
The full data set contains information on 2944 MFIs operating in 122 countries 
with 17,819 annual observations. Due to some missing values and data trimming, 
data for 947 MFIs were dropped. Therefore, the final unbalanced sample used in the 
empirical analysis contains information on 1997 MFIs operating in 109 countries 
for the period 2003–2016. The breakdown by region is 504 from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 322 from South Asia, 420 from Africa, 369 from Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 315 from East Asia and the Pacific, and 67 from the Middle East and 
North Africa. All MFIs are included regardless of their legal status: nonprofit insti-
tutions (e.g. NGOs), nonbank financial institutions, credit unions/cooperatives, rural 
banks, and one under the category of “other”. The breakdown of MFIs by type is 
589 NGOs, 638 nonbank financial institutions, 412 credit unions/cooperatives, 177 
banks, 129 rural banks, and 52 under the category “other”. Fifty-nine per cent of 
these MFIs are registered as nonprofit. To account for the problem of outliers, the 
lowest and highest 2.5% of the values of the variables used are dropped.
The data has three major caveats. First, the data used in this paper is unadjusted 
for subsidies, inflation, cost of funds, or loan loss provisioning and thus not in con-
formity with international accounting standards making comparisons across MFIs 
uncertain (Cull et al. 2009). However, since adjustment of the data requires several 
data points as inputs, the sample size of the unadjusted data is expected to be larger 
than that for the adjusted data. Second, because reporting to the MIX Market is vol-
untary, analysis based on the MIX data is susceptible to self-selection bias. This 
bias can take two forms. First, MFIs reporting to the MIX Market are likely to be 
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different from MFIs that are not reporting. Second, MFIs may report some indica-
tors for some years but not for others. MFIs that do report to the MIX Market might 
be more successful than the ones who do not and MFIs that report selective indi-
cators might be reporting the more promising ones. Bauchet and Morduch (2010a, 
b) note that successful MFIs with adequate staff and information systems volunteer 
more, that financial indicators are reported more than social indicators, and that 
reporting is correlated with the institutions’ region, mission, and size. These patterns 
of reporting can potentially impact the accuracy of our measures of competition, the 
first two in particular. Finally, the legal status of an MFI can vary over time. The 
change in the legal status can affect many of the performance indicators of the MFI 
(D’Espallier et al. 2017). However, the MIX Market database that we use does not 
reflect changes in the profit status of the MFI. If an MFI is currently registered as a 
nonbank financial institution, it will be recorded as such for all years even though 
it could have been a non-government organisation in previous years. Therefore, we 
treat the legal status of the MFIs as time invariant. Nevertheless, Wagennar (2014) 
uses the MIX Market dataset that includes 1558 MFIs and found that only 75 MFIs 
transformed to a different legal status. This relatively small number of transformed 
MFIs is highly unlikely to affect the results of this paper. The major strength of the 
MIX Market data is the large number of worldwide participating MFIs and its wide 
use in the microfinance empirical literature.
3  Variables: description and construction methodology
Our main focus is the impact of various measures of competition on microcredit 
interest rates. The dependent variable is the real yield on gross loan portfolio 
(and thereafter interest rate) defined as:
where yield on gross portfolio (nominal) is financial revenue from loans compared 
to gross loan portfolio. Microcredit interest rates include fees and commissions on 
the gross loan portfolio and income from late fees and penalties.
Table 1 presents variable description and summary statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables. In addition to a time trend, the independent variables 
are classified into three groups: MFI-specific, country-specific, and competi-
tion variables. The time effect (Trend) is the time span between the years 2003 
and 2016 for each MFI. Figure 1 shows the variation in the worldwide average 
microcredit interest rate between the years 2003 and 2016. The overall world-
wide microcredit interest rates are hardly falling over time. We do note that aver-
age worldwide interest rates were falling steadily until the global financial crisis, 
at which point they increased about 5 percentage points and have remained sta-
ble since 2010/2011.
Interest Rate =
Yield on Gross Portfolio (nominal) − Inflation Rate
1 + Inflation Rate
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3.1  MFI‑specific variables
Two sets of dummy variables are used to control for variations in interest rates within 
MFIs and regions. The first includes dummy variables for non-government MFIs 
(NGO), nonbank financial institutions (NBFI), banks (Bank), credit union/coopera-
tives (CU), rural banks (RB), and one classified as “other”. According to the MIX 
glossary, NGOs are organisations registered as nonprofit for tax purposes. They are 
usually non-deposit taking and not regulated by supervisory agencies. Banks are 
regulated financial intermediaries and may provide a number of financial services 
such as deposit taking and money transfers. NBFIs are institutions that provide sim-
ilar services to those of regular banks but usually have lower capital requirements 
and limited financial service offerings. Cooperative/Credit Unions are non-regulated, 
nonprofit, financial intermediaries that offer a range of financial services including 
deposit taking for the benefit of its members. Rural banks are institutions that serve 
clients in non-urban areas generally designed for agricultural-related activities.
The second set includes dummy variables for South Asia (SA), Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Africa (Africa), 
Eastern Asia and the Pacific (EAP), and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
Two variables, Age and Scale, are used to measure the impact of economies of scale 
and learning effects. Age takes a value of 1 if the MFI is new, a value of 2 if the MFI is 
young and a value of 3 if the MFI is mature.1 New MFIs usually start with high costs. 
As MFIs mature, they become larger; by trial and error, they may have a better abil-
ity to lower costs and interest rates. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the relationship 
between Age and interest rates takes an inverted U-shape, and the analysis includes a 
quadratic in Age, Agesq. Scale is a categorical variable based on gross loan portfolio in 
USD. We adopt this measure from the MIX Market. It takes a value of 1 if the MFI is 
small, 2 if the MFI is medium, and 3 if the MFI is large.2 Higher values reflect more 
opportunities for economies of scale and, therefore, lower interest rates.
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Interest Rate
Fig. 1  Worldwide average interest rates between the years 2003 and 2016
1 According to the MIX Market, an MFI is new if the difference between the year it started its operation 
and the year it submitted its data to the MIX Market is between 1 and 4 years, young if the difference is 
between 5 and 8 years, and mature if the difference is greater than 8 years.
2 According to the MIX Market, an MFI is large if the gross loan portfolio is 8 million or more for 
MFIs in Africa, Asia, EECA, and MENA and 15 million or for MFIs in LAC. An MFI is medium if the 
gross loan portfolio is between 2 million and 8 million for MFIs in Africa, Asia, EECA, and MENA and 
between 4 million and 15 million for MFIs in LAC. Finally, an MFI is small if the gross loan portfolio is 
less than 2 million for MFI is in Africa, Asia, EECA, and MENA and less than 4 million in LAC.
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Practitioners and researchers have documented links between the gender of the 
microfinance borrowers and the performance of the MFIs (Khandker et al. 1995: 
Kevane and Wydick 2001; Armendariz De Aghion and Morduch 2005; Emran 
et  al. 2011; D’Espallier et  al. 2013a, b; Basharat et  al. 2015). To capture the 
impact of gender on interest rates, the percentage of female borrowers (Female) 
served by each MFI is used as an additional control variable. Female is the num-
ber of active borrowers who are women divided by the total number of active 
borrowers.
The cost of loans and the productivity of staff members are two major factors 
that may influence the interest rates of an MFI. To capture these effects, we use 
the sum of the financial expense, operational expense and impairment loss relative 
to the value of assets (Total cost) and the number of active borrowers divided by 
the number of personnel (Productivity) as measures of cost and productivity. Higher 
costs are expected to be associated with higher interest rates, and higher productivity 
is expected to be associated with lower interest rates.3
3.2  Country‑specific variables
The interaction between country-level macroeconomic variables and microfinance 
financial indicators has been documented by different studies (Honohan 2004; 
Gonzalez 2007; Hermes et al. 2018; Ahlin et al. 2011; Mersland and Strøm 2013; 
Buera et al. 2012; de Quidt et al. 2018). Real GDP growth defined as the annual 
percentage growth in real GDP is used as an indicator of economic growth. It is 
a summary statistic of the overall developmental, institutional, and technological 
progress. High economic growth may increase micro-enterprise returns and the 
demand for microcredit, allowing MFIs to increase interest rates. On the other 
hand, high growth may raise household incomes and reduce the demand for micro-
credit and interest rates. Interest rates are unlikely to adjust instantaneously to 
overall economic growth. Therefore, the impact of 1-year lagged GDP growth on 
interest rates is considered. Often, various types of interest rates move together 
in the same direction. We would expect real interest rates in the home country 
to increase microcredit interest rates. We therefore introduce the real interest rate 
in the home country (Country interest) as an additional regressor; the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The level of 
development of the financial sector is expected to have a significant impact on the 
microfinance industry in general and microcredit interest rates specifically. A more 
developed financial sector is expected to be associated with lower costs to MFIs, 
higher level of competition, and higher levels of financial inclusion, all of which 
3 There are other variables that can affect microcredit interest rates. For example, subsidies and deposits 
can be perceived as cheap sources of funds and therefore subsidized, and deposit mobilising MFIs are 
expected to offer microcredit at lower interest rates. We use current year donated equity to gross loan 
portfolio and total amount of deposits relative to gross loan portfolio in the preliminary empirical work. 
The results show little evidence on the impact of deposits while this evidence is stronger for subsidies. 
The inclusion of subsidies led to a sharp decrease in the sample size and therefore dropped from the 
analysis.
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reduce interest rates. We include a proxy for the overall financial development of 
the country (Domestic credit): the amount of domestic credit to the private sec-
tor divided by GDP.4 Many policy responses to protect borrowers include impos-
ing obligatory ceilings on interest rates. Interest rate ceilings in the data sample 
apply to MFIs that operate in 32 countries (Naimbo and Gallegos 2014).5 There-
fore, MFIs operating in countries that impose interest rate ceilings are expected to 
charge lower interest rates. A dummy (Ceilings) equal to one is used if the MFI is 
in a country that imposes interest rate ceilings.6
3.3  Competition variables
The focal element of this work is the impact of competition on interest rates. To 
empirically assess the impact of competition, three measures for competition are 
constructed. These measures are based on three different aspects of competition: the 
geographical expansion of an MFI, market concentration and the difference between 
price and marginal cost.
3.3.1  Geographical expansion
The first measure of competition reflects the geographical presence of an MFI. If 
an MFI competes for more borrowers, it must acquire specific infrastructure, such 
as branch offices. Therefore, the number of branch offices of an MFI relative to the 
total number of offices of all MFIs in a given country is used as a measure of com-
petition (Office). An MFI may open a new branch office to penetrate an underserved 
area or to prevent competitors from “poaching” existing borrowers in a particular 
area. This may lead to more concentrated markets and the failure of some small 
MFIs. Therefore, a positive sign of the coefficient on Office is expected. That is, as 
an MFI expands through more branch offices relative to other MFIs, it would gain 
more monopoly power, enabling it to charge higher interest rates.
5 These countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia, China, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Armenia, Poland, Turkey, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
6 Data on interest rates ceilings are obtained from Naimbo and Gallegos (2014) who find that at least 76 
counties around the world use different forms of interest rates caps. The authors have gathered this infor-
mation from eight different sources. We assume that a country has interest rate ceiling and maintain it for 
the period of our sample (2003–2016) if it is reported by Naimbo and Gallegos (2014).
4 Other potential macroeconomic variables can affect microcredit interest rates; country’s risk premium 
is an example. The World Bank measure of risk premium defined as the interest rate charged by banks on 
loans to private sector customers minus the “risk free” treasury bill interest rate at which short-term gov-
ernment securities are issued or traded in the market show a positive impact on microcredit interest rates. 
Inclusion of this variable in the analysis, however, reduces the sample size significantly and therefore 
dropped from the analysis.
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3.3.2  Herfindahl Index
A common measure of market concentration, the Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl), is 
used as an alternative measure of competition. The Herfindahl Index is calculated by 
squaring the market share of the gross loan portfolio of each MFI that is competing 
in a country in each year and then adding across these squared shares. The expected 
sign of the coefficient on Herfindahl is positive. A larger value of the Herfindahl 
index conveys greater concentration. A value close to zero indicates a purely com-
petitive microfinance industry, and a value of one indicates a purely monopolistic 
industry. In general, a value less than 0.15 indicates low concentration, and a value 
above 0.25 indicates high concentration.7 The mean value of the Herfindahl Index in 
the current sample is 0.28, indicating the presence of highly concentrated microfi-
nance markets across countries.8
3.3.3  Lerner Index
As with any measure of competition, both Herfindahl and Office have drawbacks. 
For example, it may arise that two MFIs have the same number of branch offices 
and/or the same Herfindahl values but operate in isolated geographic areas. For 
many large (geographically or societally) countries, such as India, different MFIs 
can focus on different areas. Thus, while these measures may indicate strong compe-
tition among MFIs in a country, it is a possibility that MFIs might also be operating 
in different areas with no effective competition. In addition, the Herfindahl Index 
can be misleading because higher concentration does not necessarily imply a lack of 
competition, Bikker and Haaf (2002).
To mitigate against this potential situation, a third alternative measure of com-
petition, the Lerner Index (Lerner), is constructed. This index is ratio of the MFI’s 
markup (the difference between price and marginal cost) to price. The expected sign 
of the coefficient on the Lerner Index is positive. The Lerner Index has been widely 
used in the banking literature (Angelini and Cetorelli 2003; Fernandez de Guevara 
et al. 2005; Maudos and Fernandez de Cuevara 2007; Kasman and Kasman 2015). 
Assefa et al. (2013) were the first to use the Lerner Index in the microfinance lit-
erature. Clearly, the appropriateness of using this measure depends on the accuracy 
of measuring marginal cost and price when there is almost always ambiguity as to 
how to construct an institution’s marginal cost (e.g. risk provision and subsidies) and 
price, particularly in the banking industry.
To estimate the marginal cost, a translog cost function is first estimated, where 
cost is a function of output and the prices of three input factors:
7 For example, the U. S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission use these cutoffs as a 
guideline for horizontal mergers.
8 We have also used the Herfindahl Index based on the number of active borrowers to reflect the dual 
mission of the MFIs (Hartarska et al. 2010). The results obtained from this measure are similar to the 
results obtained from the Herfindahl Index based on the gross loan portfolio.
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In the equation above, Ci,t represents the total cost for MFI i at time t, which 
includes financial expense, operational expense, and impairment loss (Cost). Q rep-
resents output measured by gross loan portfolio (Gross Loan Portfolio), w represents 
the price of labour measured as the ratio of the personnel expense to the number 
of personnel (Plabor), rph represents the price of physical capital measured as the 
administrative expense relative to the net fixed assets (Pcapital), and rf represents 
the price of financial capital measured as the interest expense on borrowings rela-
tive to total borrowings (Pfcapital). Following Hartarska et al. (2013), we include 
credit risk (Risk) to account for portfolio quality and a time trend (Trend) to account 
for technological change. Risk is the ratio of loans greater than 30  days past due 
relative to the gross loan portfolio. To control for differences in the cost functions 
of different types of MFIs, a vector of dummies for the type of the MFI (MFItype) 
is included: NGO, NBFI, Bank, CU, RB, and Other. The dummy for NGO is used as 
the baseline variable. Providing saving services may necessitate minimum balance 
requirements, financial and administrative obligations all of which may increases 
costs. To account for the cost of providing saving, we include a dummy for MFIs 
that provide deposit services (Saving).
The term ε is the noise component, v is the cost inefficiency component, and βs 
are parameters to be estimated. Homogeneity in input prices requires the following 
restrictions on Eq. (1):
These restrictions are imposed by dividing input prices and total cost by the price 
of physical capital. While the translog cost function can be estimated directly, 
(1)
lnCi,t = 훽0 + 훽1 lnQi,t + 훽2 lnwi,t + 훽3 ln rphi,t + 훽4 ln rfi,t +
1
2
훽5
(
lnQi,t
)2
+
1
2
훽6
(
lnwi,t
)2
+
1
2
훽7
(
ln rphi,t
)2
+
1
2
훽8
(
ln rfi,t
)2
+ 훽9 lnQi,t lnwi,t + 훽10 lnQi,t ln rphi,t
+ 훽11 lnQi,t ln rfi,t + 훽12 lnwi,t ln rphi,t + 훽13 lnwi,t ln rfi,t + 훽14 ln rphi,t ln rfi,t
+ 훽15 lnRiski,t +
1
2
훽16
(
lnRiski,t
)2
+ 훽17 lnRiski,t lnQi,t + 훽18 lnRiski,t lnwi,t
+ 훽19 lnRiski,t ln rphi,t + 훽20 lnRiski,t ln rfi,t + 훽21Trendi,t + 훽22
(
Trendi,t
)2
+ 훽23Trendi,t lnQi,t + 훽24Trendi,t lnwi,t + 훽25Trendi,t ln rphi,t + 훽26Trendit ln rfi,t
+ 훽27Trendi,t lnRiski,t + 훽28MFItypei,t + 훽29Savingdummyi,t + 훽30Countryi,j
+ 휀i,t + vi,t
훽2 + 훽3 + 훽4 = 1;
훽9 + 훽10 + 훽11 = 0;
훽12 + 훽13 + 훽14 = 0;
훽18 + 훽19 + 훽20 = 0;
훽24 + 훽25 + 훽26 = 0;
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estimating it jointly with share equations can improve the efficiency of estimation 
(Hartarska et al. 2013). By differentiating the translog cost function with respect to 
input prices and employing Shephard’s Lemma, we obtain the following cost share 
equations:
where cross-equation parameters restrictions are imposed. We operationalise the 
cost share equations by dropping the cost share equation of physical capital leaving 
us with a non-singular system. The translog cost function and the cost share equa-
tions are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression.
Taking the derivative of Eq. (1) with respect to output (elasticity of total cost with 
respect to output) yields:
The first term in Eq.  (2) is the marginal cost (MC). Equation (2) therefore can be 
rewritten as:
Using Eq. (1), the first term of Eq. (3) is:
sw =
휕 lnCi,t
휕wi,t
= 훽2 + 훽6 lnwi,t + 훽9 lnQi,t + B12 ln rphi,t + 훽13 ln rfi,t
+ 훽18 lnRiski,t + 훽24Timei,t
srph =
휕 lnCi,t
휕 ln rphi,t
= 훽3 + 훽7 ln rphi,t + 훽10 lnQi,t + 훽12 lnwi,t + 훽14 ln rfi,t
+ 훽19 lnRiski,t + 훽25Timei,t
srf =
휕 lnCi,t
휕 ln rfi,t
= 훽3 + 훽8 ln rfi,t + 훽11 lnQi,t + 훽13 lnwi,t + 훽14 ln rphi,t
+ 훽20 lnRiski,t + 훽26Timei,t
(2)
휕 lnCi,t
휕 lnQi,t
=
(
휕Ci,t
휕Qi,t
)(
Qi,t
Ci,t
)
(3)MCi,t =
(
휕 lnCi,t
휕 lnQi,t
)(
Ci,t
Qi,t
)
(4)
휕 lnCi,t
휕 lnQi,t
= 훽1 + 훽5 lnQi,t + 훽9 lnwi,t + 훽10 ln rphi,t + 훽11 ln rfi,t + 훽17 lnRiski,t + 훽23Timei,t
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Substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) yields:
Once Eq. (1) is estimated, the estimated coefficients (훽1, 훽5, 훽9, 훽10, 훽11, 훽17, 훽23) and 
the observed variables for total cost (Cost), output (Gross Loan Portfolio), and input 
prices (Plabor) and (Pfcapital) are used to calculate the marginal cost in Eq. (5).
Once the marginal cost is estimated, the Lerner Index is then computed as:
where Li,t is the Lerner Index of MFI i at time t, MC is the marginal cost as esti-
mated above, and P is the output price calculated as the ratio of financial revenue 
from loans to gross loan portfolio.9 Price excludes both fees and commissions on the 
gross loan portfolio and income from the late fees and penalties. Table 2 presents 
the summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the translog cost function, as 
well the as price of output (Price) as defined above.
Table 3 shows the description of the variables and summary statistics for Price, 
Marginal Cost and the Lerner Index.
The evolution of competition as measured by the Lerner Index as well as by Office 
and Herfindahl is shown in Fig. 2. The MFIs’ shares in terms of office branches were 
falling until 2008 then began rising while the Herfindahl Index has been slightly fall-
ing over time in non-monotonic manner.10 Unlike the Herfindahl Index, the Lerner 
Index shows that the overall monopoly power of the MFIs has been rising overtime. 
This is consistent with Kar (2016) who, using the Boone indicator, finds that compe-
tition was falling in major countries such as Bangladesh and Bolivia.
The pairwise correlation between the worldwide trends in Herfindahl and Office is 
0.24 while it is − 0.59 and − 0.47 between the Lerner Index and Office and between 
the Lerner Index and Herfindahl, respectively. The positive correlation between 
Office and Herfindahl is expected but the negative correlation between the Lerner 
Index and Office and between the Lerner Index and Herfindahl is not. In the pre-
liminary empirical work, we have noticed that MFIs that have high values of Office 
and high values of Herfindahl serve less women. The pairwise correlations between 
the percentage of female borrowers and the Lerner Index, Office, and Herfindahl 
are 0.12, − 0.13 and − 0.18, respectively. MFIs that have higher shares of office 
branches and higher shares in gross loan portfolio seem to serve fewer female bor-
rowers, while MFIs that have higher Lerner indices are associated with more women 
(5)
MCi,t =
Ci,t
Qi,t
(
훽1 + 훽5 lnQi,t + 훽9 lnwi,t + 훽10 ln rphi,t + 훽11 ln rfi,t + 훽17 lnRiski,t + 훽23Timei,t
)
(6)Li,t =
(
Pi,t −MCi,t
Pi,t
)
10 For more details on the impact of the global financial crisis on microfinance, see Bella Di (2011).
9 We have also used the number of active borrowers as a measure of output (Caudill et al. 2012) in the 
cost function. The marginal cost and the price of output obtained by dividing the total financial revenue 
by the number of active borrowers are used to compute the Lerner Index. The results obtained from this 
measure are similar to the results obtained when using gross loan portfolio as an output.
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borrowers. MFIs with higher values of Office and Herfindahl serve less women who 
usually have less access to formal financial services (Emran et  al. 2011), receive 
smaller loans and pay higher interest rates compare to men (D’Espallier et al. 2013a, 
b). Higher interest rates and smaller loans, which reduce MFIs’ scale economies, 
both lower the value of the Lerner Index.
4  Estimation
With panel data, it is possible to control for some forms of observation specific het-
erogeneity. At issue is the nature of how this heterogeneity is treated within the con-
ditional mean. The most commonly considered settings are the fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) framework. In the RE framework, independence between 
the explanatory variables and the unobserved individual heterogeneity is assumed. If 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Office
0.2
0.3
0.4
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Herfindahl
0.2
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0.3
0.35
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0.45
0.5
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Lerner
Fig. 2  Evolution of competition as measured by Office, Herfindahl, and Lerner indices
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this assumption is satisfied, the random effects estimator is unbiased and efficient. If 
the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables, then the 
fixed effects framework is preferred. The choice between the FE and RE frameworks 
can easily be tested through the Hausman test, though, given the consistency of the 
FE estimator under the RE framework, Guggenberger (2010) recommends deploy-
ing the FE estimator for any subsequent inference.
Use of the fixed effect framework involves three main disadvantages. First, within 
the fixed effects framework it is not possible to estimate the impact of time-invariant 
factors that may be of interest such as regional locations of the MFIs, MFI type, 
and countrywide variables, such as Ceilings. Second, in the fixed effects framework, 
slowly changing values of the explanatory variables can result in imprecise coef-
ficient estimates (Beck 2001). Third, the use of the fixed effects framework results 
in a loss of efficiency (relative to alternative assumptions on the nature of unob-
served heterogeneity) as these models overlook variations across individuals (Bal-
tagi 2005). Since the choice between the fixed and random effects frameworks in 
our context is not straightforward, and for comparability, we report estimates from 
both frameworks. We also report cluster robust (at the institution level) Huber/White 
standard errors for all estimates.
In response to this all or nothing choice of correlation between the individual 
effects and the regressors, Hausman–Taylor (1981) proposed an estimator where 
some of the regressors are correlated with the individual effects. The estimator is 
based on an instrumental variable estimator that uses both the between and within 
variation of the strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. The Hausman–Taylor 
estimator allows for possible correlation of some of the regressors with the unob-
served effects and provides consistent parameter estimates of the time-varying 
variables. It forms its own set of instruments with internal variables and assumes 
four categories of explanatory variables: exogenous and endogenous time-vary-
ing regressors and exogenous and endogenous time-invariant regressors. In order 
to deploy the Hausman–Taylor estimator, one has to first distinguish between the 
endogenous variables (variables correlated with the unobserved individual effects) 
and the exogenous variables (variables not correlated with the unobserved indi-
vidual effects). Identification requires that the number of exogenous time-variant 
variables is not less than the number of endogenous time-invariant variables and 
a sufficient correlation between the endogenous time-invariant variables and the 
instruments found in the process (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2007). The endogenous 
variables are identified by finding the correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the unobserved individual effects at one per cent significance level. The valid-
ity of the internal instruments is assessed through the Sargan–Hansen test of ove-
ridentification. The analysis includes both univariate and multivariate models as a 
way to check for robustness. Table 4 shows the results of regressing interest rates 
on Trend, and the competition measures one at a time. Some researchers express 
concerns about data quality in evaluating the indicators of MFIs (Bauchet and 
Morduch 2010a, b; Mersland and Strøm 2010). To ensure that the results are not 
driven by quality and the availability of data, estimates for the interest rate model 
using data from MFIs with four and five diamonds are presented in Table 5. For 
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comparability, Table 6 presents the estimates using only data from MFIs with one 
and three diamonds.  
As indicated by Assefa et al. (2013), applying the concept of competition to all 
MFIs may render meaningless and unreliable results. To test if the profit status of an 
MFI makes a difference in its monopolistic behaviour, we divide the sample of the 
MFIs into for-profit and nonprofit according to their MIX Market classification.11
The estimates corresponding to for-profit MFIs are shown in Table  7, while 
Table  8 presents the results for nonprofit MFIs. Finally, using all available data, 
Table 9 shows the results of both the fixed and random effects models and Table 10 
reports the results of the Hausman–Taylor model.
An additional remaining empirical issue is that the Lerner Index is a gener-
ated regressor. According to Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel (1985), while a 
two-step linear estimation method yields consistent estimates of the coefficients in 
the second stage regression, the standard errors will be inconsistent as they fail to 
account for the presence of a generated regressor. Consequently, statistical infer-
ences can be biased in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis. To overcome this 
issue, we use bootstrapping method where we include both parts of the estimation 
for every bootstrap sample.
Table 4  Univariate results
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
(1)
FE
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
RE
(5)
FE
(6)
RE
Trend − 0.00233***
(0.000442)
− 0.00231***
(0.000432)
− 0.00259***
(0.000465)
− 0.00243***
(0.000452)
− 0.00215***
(0.000304)
− 0.00220***
(0.000298)
Office 0.0687***
(0.0153)
0.0618***
(0.0137)
Herfindahl 0.0134
(0.0119)
0.0235**
(0.0102)
Lerner 0.0205***
(0.00514)
0.0275***
(0.00514)
Constant 0.247***
(0.00294)
0.244***
(0.00405)
0.253***
(0.00434)
0.245***
(0.00515)
0.250***
(0.00347)
0.247***
(0.00303)
R-squared 0.0168 0.0167 0.0142 0.0140 0.0158 0.0153
MFIs 1997 1997 1887 1887 1362 1362
N 9893 9893 8974 8974 6140 6140
11 In addition to using the MIX Market classification, we split the MFIs into different subsamples. First, 
we split the MFIs into a group that includes NGOs and cooperatives/credit unions, which are regis-
tered as nonprofit MFIs and a group that includes banks, nonbank financial institutions, and rural banks 
broadly defined to be for-profit MFIs. Second, in response to Cull et al. (2009) who argue that “Nonbank 
financial institutions are in a broad category that includes both for-profit and nonprofit,” we split MFIs 
into two groups, the first group includes banks and rural banks and the other group includes nonbank 
financial institutions only. The monopolistic behaviour of the MFIs was consistent across all these sub-
samples.
 M. Al-Azzam, C. Parmeter 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
5 
 M
ul
tiv
ar
iat
e r
es
ul
ts 
fo
r M
FI
s w
ith
 4 
an
d 5
 di
am
on
ds
(1
)
FE
(2
)
RE
(3
)
FE
(4
)
RE
(5
)
FE
(6
)
RE
Tr
en
d
− 
0.0
01
80
**
(0
.00
09
06
)
− 
0.0
00
92
6
(0
.00
07
77
)
− 
0.0
02
05
**
(0
.00
10
0)
− 
0.0
01
46
*
(0
.00
08
40
)
− 
0.0
01
60
*
(0
.00
08
99
)
− 
0.0
01
50
**
(0
.00
07
28
)
M
FI
-sp
ec
ifi
c v
ar
iab
les
 N
BF
I
0.0
17
4*
*
(0
.00
72
8)
0.0
19
2*
*
(0
.00
77
0)
0.0
10
1*
*
(0
.00
42
6)
 B
an
k
− 
0.0
01
75
(0
.01
06
)
0.0
00
25
6
(0
.01
09
)
− 
0.0
07
21
(0
.00
65
9)
 C
U
− 
0.0
32
6*
**
(0
.00
96
5)
− 
0.0
40
0*
**
(0
.01
00
)
− 
0.0
33
1*
**
(0
.00
61
8)
 R
B
− 
0.0
11
9
(0
.01
28
)
0.0
03
99
(0
.01
97
)
− 
0.0
37
5*
**
(0
.00
75
4)
 O
th
er
− 
0.0
10
3
(0
.02
13
)
− 
0.0
07
53
(0
.01
93
)
− 
0.0
19
8
(0
.01
46
)
 M
EN
A
0.1
06
**
*
(0
.01
38
)
0.1
11
**
*
(0
.01
43
)
0.1
01
**
*
(0
.00
83
8)
 A
fr
ic
a
0.0
80
1*
**
(0
.01
30
)
0.0
85
8*
**
(0
.01
41
)
0.0
86
0*
**
(0
.01
07
)
 E
EC
A
0.0
59
1*
**
(0
.01
01
)
0.0
63
3*
**
(0
.01
14
)
0.0
57
9*
**
(0
.00
78
4)
 L
AC
0.1
03
**
*
(0
.00
83
2)
0.1
07
**
*
(0
.00
87
1)
0.0
93
5*
**
(0
.00
66
7)
 E
AP
0.1
38
**
*
(0
.01
22
)
0.1
29
**
*
(0
.01
87
)
0.1
63
**
*
(0
.00
95
4)
 A
ge
0.0
29
5
(0
.02
33
)
0.0
21
3
(0
.02
12
)
0.0
49
1*
*
(0
.02
49
)
0.0
36
9*
(0
.02
24
)
0.0
33
9
(0
.02
80
)
0.0
34
8
(0
.02
42
)
 A
ge
sq
− 
0.0
07
51
(0
.00
52
6)
− 
0.0
06
16
(0
.00
48
0)
− 
0.0
12
2*
*
(0
.00
56
8)
− 
0.0
10
0*
(0
.00
51
4)
− 
0.0
09
36
(0
.00
61
4)
− 
0.0
08
32
(0
.00
54
1)
1 3
Competition and microcredit interest rates: international…
Ta
bl
e 
5 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(1
)
FE
(2
)
RE
(3
)
FE
(4
)
RE
(5
)
FE
(6
)
RE
 Sc
al
e
− 
0.0
02
68
(0
.00
40
5)
− 
0.0
03
48
(0
.00
30
4)
− 
0.0
01
42
(0
.00
44
5)
− 
0.0
01
42
(0
.00
32
7)
0.0
01
29
(0
.00
45
7)
0.0
00
61
5
(0
.00
29
6)
 To
ta
l c
os
t
0.3
41
**
*
(0
.03
90
)
0.4
92
**
*
(0
.03
05
)
0.3
74
**
*
(0
.04
64
)
0.4
94
**
*
(0
.03
39
)
0.3
46
**
*
(0
.04
74
)
0.5
37
**
*
(0
.03
30
)
 F
em
al
e
0.0
55
0*
**
(0
.01
34
)
0.0
77
9*
**
(0
.01
05
)
0.0
74
3*
**
(0
.01
63
)
0.0
91
3*
**
(0
.01
24
)
0.0
45
8*
**
(0
.01
50
)
0.0
85
6*
**
(0
.01
19
)
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
− 
0.0
00
53
7
(0
.00
04
34
)
− 
0.0
00
22
1
(0
.00
03
20
)
− 
0.0
00
47
5
(0
.00
04
48
)
− 
0.0
00
27
6
(0
.00
03
32
)
− 
0.0
00
41
1
(0
.00
04
94
)
0.0
00
04
21
(0
.00
03
34
)
Co
un
try
-sp
ec
ifi
c v
ar
iab
les
 G
ro
w
th
− 
0.0
01
15
**
*
(0
.00
03
42
)
− 
0.0
01
32
**
*
(0
.00
03
20
)
− 
0.0
01
10
**
*
(0
.00
03
76
)
− 
0.0
01
22
**
*
(0
.00
03
50
)
− 
0.0
01
46
**
*
(0
.00
04
18
)
− 
0.0
01
68
**
*
(0
.00
03
60
)
 C
ou
nt
ry
 in
te
re
st
0.0
02
90
**
*
(0
.00
02
44
)
0.0
02
67
**
*
(0
.00
02
18
)
0.0
02
83
**
*
(0
.00
02
56
)
0.0
02
57
**
*
(0
.00
02
29
)
0.0
03
43
**
*
(0
.00
02
87
)
0.0
02
94
**
*
(0
.00
02
15
)
 D
om
es
tic
 c
re
di
t
− 
0.0
00
23
2
(0
.00
02
57
)
− 
0.0
00
72
2*
**
(0
.00
01
45
)
− 
0.0
00
56
7*
*
(0
.00
02
87
)
− 
0.0
00
72
5*
**
(0
.00
01
64
)
− 
0.0
00
38
3
(0
.00
03
17
)
− 
0.0
00
62
3*
**
(0
.00
01
42
)
 C
ei
lin
g
− 
0.0
28
4*
**
(0
.00
74
3)
− 
0.0
34
2*
**
(0
.00
82
9)
− 
0.0
31
5*
**
(0
.00
42
6)
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n v
ar
iab
les
 O
ffi
ce
0.0
60
4*
**
(0
.02
14
)
0.0
35
3*
*
(0
.01
74
)
 H
er
fin
da
hl
− 
0.0
12
0
(0
.01
77
)
− 
0.0
01
57
(0
.01
38
)
 L
er
ne
r
0.0
18
2*
**
(0
.00
58
9)
0.0
17
4*
**
(0
.00
48
2)
Co
ns
tan
t
0.1
12
**
*
(0
.02
93
)
0.0
21
8
(0
.02
72
)
0.0
90
5*
**
(0
.03
32
)
0.0
01
60
(0
.02
95
)
0.1
09
**
*
(0
.03
22
)
− 
0.0
23
8
(0
.02
67
)
 M. Al-Azzam, C. Parmeter 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
5 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(1
)
FE
(2
)
RE
(3
)
FE
(4
)
RE
(5
)
FE
(6
)
RE
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.1
81
2
0.1
72
4
0.1
95
6
0.1
90
3
0.1
97
2
0.1
83
1
M
FI
s
10
29
10
29
91
6
91
6
80
9
80
9
N
40
19
40
19
35
29
35
29
28
73
28
73
St
an
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
in
 pa
re
nt
he
se
s: 
*p
 <
 0.
10
; *
*p
 <
 0.
05
; *
**
p <
 0.
01
1 3
Competition and microcredit interest rates: international…
Table 6  Multivariate results for MFIs with less than 4 diamonds
(1)
FE
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
RE
(5)
FE
(6)
RE
Trend 0.00366**
(0.00176)
0.00513***
(0.00152)
0.00450**
(0.00195)
0.00657***
(0.00162)
0.00449**
(0.00213)
0.00495***
(0.00167)
MFI-specific variables
 NBFI 0.0277***
(0.00838)
0.0260***
(0.00848)
0.0229***
(0.00594)
 Bank 0.0315**
(0.0127)
0.0339**
(0.0136)
0.0275***
(0.00924)
 CU − 0.0349***
(0.00999)
− 0.0318***
(0.0101)
− 0.0354***
(0.00819)
 RB − 0.0285
(0.0184)
− 0.0459**
(0.0197)
− 0.0328**
(0.0144)
 Other 0.0290
(0.0197)
0.0439**
(0.0180)
0.00632
(0.00976)
 MENA 0.0966***
(0.0174)
0.0881***
(0.0178)
0.0862***
(0.0161)
 Africa 0.0752***
(0.0135)
0.0684***
(0.0145)
0.0938***
(0.0107)
 EECA 0.0502***
(0.0135)
0.0404***
(0.0136)
0.0702***
(0.0103)
 LAC 0.118***
(0.0107)
0.119***
(0.0107)
0.120***
(0.00914)
 EAP 0.135***
(0.0151)
0.144***
(0.0164)
0.161***
(0.0105)
 Age 0.0660**
(0.0327)
0.0703**
(0.0306)
− 0.0378
(0.0369)
0.0141
(0.0343)
0.0257
(0.0508)
0.0461
(0.0413)
 Agesq − 0.0131*
(0.00751)
− 0.0151**
(0.00706)
0.00950
(0.00812)
− 0.00259
(0.00765)
− 0.00538
(0.0108)
− 0.0101
(0.00910)
 Scale − 0.00859
(0.00797)
− 0.00383
(0.00405)
− 0.000884
(0.00774)
− 0.00128
(0.00385)
− 0.0146
(0.00935)
− 0.00746
(0.00468)
 Total cost 0.261***
(0.0681)
0.494***
(0.0411)
0.212***
(0.0717)
0.486***
(0.0432)
0.297***
(0.0830)
0.522***
(0.0531)
 Female 0.0602***
(0.0206)
0.0972***
(0.0141)
0.0379**
(0.0189)
0.0818***
(0.0136)
0.0810**
(0.0380)
0.0928***
(0.0181)
 Produc-
tivity
− 0.00126**
(0.000637)
− 0.000967**
(0.000431)
− 0.00148**
(0.000695)
− 0.000991**
(0.000462)
− 0.000847
(0.000682)
− 0.00114**
(0.000480)
Country-specific variables
 Growth − 0.000405
(0.000546)
− 0.000912*
(0.000534)
− 0.000443
(0.000544)
− 0.00118**
(0.000552)
− 0.000177
(0.000826)
− 0.00120**
(0.000599)
 Country 
interest
0.00164***
(0.000487)
0.000907**
(0.000374)
0.00187***
(0.000519)
0.000620
(0.000401)
0.00122
(0.000766)
0.0000260
(0.000403)
 Domestic 
credit
− 0.00130**
(0.000542)
− 0.00134***
(0.000204)
− 0.00127***
(0.000429)
− 0.00142***
(0.000181)
− 0.00200***
(0.000755)
− 0.00156***
(0.000230)
 Ceiling − 0.0273***
(0.00996)
− 0.0325***
(0.00943)
− 0.0160**
(0.00648)
Competition variables
 Office 0.00614
(0.0328)
0.0166
(0.0201)
 Herfind-
ahl
− 0.00467
(0.0187)
− 0.0111
(0.0155)
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In addition to dropping the lowest and highest 2.5% of the values of each variable 
used (to mitigate the impact of outliers) several other robustness checks were under-
taken: converting the unbalanced data to a balanced panel and the use of median and 
robust regressions. Each of these exercises yielded similar results to those obtained 
from our baseline estimates. These results are not presented here but are available 
upon request.
5  Results and discussion
The estimates pertaining to the MFI and country-specific control variables are first 
briefly discussed. Our estimates for these variables are, in general, in line with the 
extant literature. The overall results for Trend, and in conjunction with Fig. 1, sug-
gest that the evolution of interest rates over time are not stable and that interest 
rates vary by both MFI type and region.12 In general, the results show an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between Age and interest rates, and they show that larger 
MFIs, as measured by Scale, tend to charge lower interest rates. The impacts of 
Age and Scale are most evident in the full samples. On average, female borrowers 
are charged higher interest rates relative to male borrowers. As expected, the esti-
mates show that total cost is a strong predictor of interest rates in all subsamples. In 
addition, the overall estimates indicate that MFIs with more productive staff mem-
bers provide microcredit at lower interest rates. The impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on microcredit interest rates is also evident. The lagged growth of the 
domestic economy is negatively related to interest rates. Higher economic growth 
may allow MFIs to better access less costly funds and, at the same time, may reduce 
household demand for microcredit, as they substitute away to commercial banks, 
both of which reduce interest rates. The results also suggest that microcredit interest 
rates move tightly with the home country lending interest rates. In addition, a more 
developed financial sector, measured by domestic credit to private sector, seems to 
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 6  (continued)
(1)
FE
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
RE
(5)
FE
(6)
RE
 Lerner 0.0192
(0.0122)
0.0200*
(0.0111)
Constant 0.127***
(0.0465)
− 0.0285
(0.0375)
0.246***
(0.0618)
0.0477
(0.0445)
0.185***
(0.0695)
0.00909
(0.0460)
R-squared 0.1200 0.1041 0.1069 0.0800 0.1554 0.1316
MFIs 949 949 879 879 663 663
N 2152 2152 1830 1830 1334 1334
12 While the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that interest rates are falling over time, the results from the 
rest of the tables reveal different trends.
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Table 7  Multivariate results for for-profit MFIs
(1)
FE
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
RE
(5)
FE
(6)
RE
Trend − 0.000135
(0.00104)
0.000614
(0.000920)
0.000339
(0.00114)
0.00102
(0.000976)
0.000611
(0.000842)
0.00154**
(0.000722)
MFI-specific variables
 NBFI − 0.0138
(0.0361)
0.0124
(0.0256)
0.000531
 Bank − 0.0353
(0.0382)
− 0.00636
(0.0283)
− 0.0178
(0.0200)
 CU − 0.0650*
(0.0366)
− 0.0332
(0.0285)
− 0.0561**
(0.0246)
 RB − 0.0460
(0.0384)
− 0.0325
(0.0308)
− 0.0508***
(0.0189)
 Other − 0.0203
(0.0467)
0.00773
(0.0398)
− 0.0267
(0.0303)
 MENA 0.0134
(0.0297)
− 0.0318
(0.0281)
0.0216
(0.0160)
 Africa 0.0862***
(0.0191)
0.0555**
(0.0226)
0.0788***
(0.0119)
 EECA 0.0469***
(0.0155)
0.0183
(0.0175)
0.0345***
(0.0113)
 LAC 0.131***
(0.0135)
0.116***
(0.0139)
0.114***
(0.00934)
 EAP 0.127***
(0.0184)
0.122***
(0.0209)
0.151***
(0.0132)
 Age − 0.00496
(0.0242)
0.00639
(0.0224)
0.000757
(0.0223)
0.0120
(0.0207)
− 0.00870
(0.0215)
0.00636
(0.0202)
 Agesq 0.00269
(0.00556)
− 0.00103
(0.00518)
0.00144
(0.00511)
− 0.00219
(0.00479)
0.00214
(0.00468)
− 0.00135
(0.00448)
 Scale 0.000972
(0.00523)
− 0.00591
(0.00419)
0.00272
(0.00556)
− 0.00313
(0.00438)
0.00175
(0.00483)
− 0.00517
(0.00392)
 Total cost 0.397***
(0.0526)
0.525***
(0.0407)
0.388***
(0.0548)
0.514***
(0.0442)
0.350***
(0.0480)
0.538***
(0.0385)
 Female 0.0623***
(0.0219)
0.0918***
(0.0155)
0.0712***
(0.0222)
0.0970***
(0.0166)
0.0499***
(0.0180)
0.0918***
(0.0116)
 Produc-
tivity
− 0.000595
(0.000531)
− 0.000497
(0.000435)
− 0.000667
(0.000528)
− 0.000588
(0.000444)
− 0.000760
(0.000511)
− 0.000454
(0.000424)
Country-specific variables
 Growth − 0.000646*
(0.000365)
− 0.000888**
(0.000359)
− 0.000287
(0.000407)
− 0.000421
(0.000406)
− 0.000894**
(0.000446)
− 0.00140***
(0.000442)
 Country 
interest
0.00231***
(0.000324)
0.00162***
(0.000313)
0.00253***
(0.000321)
0.00184***
(0.000317)
0.00293***
(0.000370)
0.00207***
(0.000294)
 Domestic 
credit
− 0.00150***
(0.000365)
− 0.00113***
(0.000240)
− 0.00178***
(0.000407)
− 0.00148***
(0.000270)
− 0.00104***
(0.000286)
− 0.000930***
(0.000182)
 Ceiling − 0.0349***
(0.0101)
− 0.0474***
(0.0104)
− 0.0513***
(0.00504)
Competition variables
 Office 0.0697***
(0.0249)
0.0436**
(0.0202)
 Herfind-
ahl
0.0657***
(0.0230)
0.0533***
(0.0179)
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be a strong predictor of lower interest rates. Unsurprisingly, MFIs subject to interest 
rate ceilings appear to charge lower interest rates.
The overall impact of competition on interest rates is evident across all models, 
specifications, and subsamples. Broadly speaking, the results indicate that MFIs 
with more monopoly power charge higher interest rates.
The coefficients on Office are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
MFIs with a greater share of the total number of office branches charge higher inter-
est rates. This relationship holds except for MFIs with a diamond rating between one 
and three (Table  6) where the impact, though positive (and economically signifi-
cant), is statistically insignificant. MFIs usually expand in more marginalised areas 
where communities have little access to financial services.13 Such an expansion may 
allow these MFIs to gain additional monopoly power and charge higher interest 
rates. In addition, such an expansion may lead to more concentrated markets and the 
failure of some smaller MFIs, both of which increase interest rates.
The overall results for Herfindahl suggest, albeit weakly, that higher concentra-
tion in terms of gross loan portfolio tends to increase interest rates. The coefficient 
estimates on Herfindhal are positive and statistically significant in only 3 of the 12 
specifications considered. This measure may not be a good proxy for competition, as 
it may fail to capture the geographical scope and market segmentation of the oper-
ating environment for MFIs in a given country. For example, each MFI may have 
a 10% market share, but may occupy 10 different areas in which they are monop-
oly providers with no actual competition against each other. In addition, it does not 
account for the availability of close lending substitutes offered by moneylenders and 
commercial banks that may dilute the monopoly power of the MFIs.
In general, the first two measures of competition do not reflect the MFI-specific 
demand that determines an MFI’s ability to raise prices and can be confronted for 
their ability and their use as measures of monopoly power. MFIs that set a price 
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 7  (continued)
(1)
FE
(2)
RE
(3)
FE
(4)
RE
(5)
FE
(6)
RE
 Lerner 0.0144**
(0.00721)
0.0114*
(0.00600)
Constant 0.147***
(0.0351)
0.0695
(0.0481)
0.122***
(0.0365)
0.0450
(0.0407)
0.158***
(0.0391)
0.0524
(0.0390)
R-squared 0.1936 0.1802 0.1882 0.1760 0.1846 0.1653
MFIs 558 558 534 534 435 435
N 2582 2582 2365 2365 1820 1820
13 The impact of competition based on office share can depend on the number of branches of commercial 
banks. More branches of commercial banks may reduce the monopoly power of the MFIs with more 
office shares. To address this point, we add the number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 people 
provided by the World Bank as a new independent variable and its interaction term with Office. The sign 
of the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but statistically insignificant.
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Table 10  Multivariate results of the full sample: Hausman–Taylor estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Time-varying exogenous variables
 Trend 0.000258
(0.000406)
Scale − 0.00721***
(0.00263)
Trend 0.00111**
(0.000435)
 Scale − 0.00630***
(0.00232)
Productivity − 0.00651**
(0.00259)
Age 0.0320**
(0.0136)
 Productivity − 0.00653***
(0.00226)
Growth − 0.000481*
(0.000270)
Agesq − 0.00871***
(0.00311)
 Growth − 0.000667***
(0.000249)
Domestic credit − 0.00113***
(0.000177)
Scale − 0.00686***
(0.00244)
Productivity − 0.00648**
(0.00263)
Growth − 0.00105***
(0.000287)
Domestic credit − 0.000996***
(0.000154)
Time-varying endogenous variables
 Age 0.0378***
(0.0116)
Trend 0.000390
(0.000452)
Total cost 0.331***
(0.0193)
 Agesq − 0.00831***
(0.00268)
Age 0.0473***
(0.0134)
Female 0.0615***
(0.0102)
 Total cost 0.316***
(0.0149)
Agesq − 0.0108***
(0.00308)
Country interest 0.00253***
(0.000184)
 Female 0.0595***
(0.00883)
Total cost 0.342***
(0.0167)
Lerner 0.00984***
 Country inter-
est
0.00230***
(0.000159)
Female 0.0718***
(0.00993)
 Domestic 
credit
− 0.000863***
(0.000152)
Country interest 0.00223***
(0.000170)
 Office 0.0572***
(0.0119)
Herfindahl − 0.0206
(0.0127)
Time-invariant exogenous variables
 Bank − 0.0190
(0.0262)
NBFI 0.0893
(0.104)
NBFI 0.0152
(0.0140)
 CU − 0.0826***
(0.0246)
Bank 0.0555
(0.0880)
Bank − 0.0101
(0.0185)
 RB − 0.0636*
(0.0348)
CU − 0.00458
(0.0901)
CU − 0.0598***
(0.0146)
 Other − 0.00827
(0.0399)
RB 0.00541
(0.0637)
RB − 0.0354
(0.0704)
 MENA 0.0544
(0.0496)
MENA 0.0403
(0.103)
Other 0.00226
(0.0303)
 Africa 0.0577
(0.0608)
Africa 0.0680
(0.0499)
MENA 0.0848***
(0.0274)
 EAP 0.134***
(0.0225)
EAP 0.144***
(0.0356)
Africa 0.0863***
(0.0222)
Ceiling − 0.0401**
 M. Al-Azzam, C. Parmeter 
1 3
considerably above marginal cost are perceived to have higher monopoly power 
and, therefore, charge higher interest rates.14 The impact of competition measured 
through the Lerner Index appears to be consistent across all models and subsam-
ples. The coefficient estimates are all positive and economically and statistically 
significant except for the fixed effects framework with MFIs with a diamond rat-
ing between one and three (Table 6). Higher values of interest rates are associated 
with higher values of the Lerner Index. That is, MFIs that possess higher monopoly 
power tend to charge higher interest rates.15
Unlike Roberts (2013) and Baquero et al. (2018), this paper finds that both for-
profit and nonprofit MFIs respond to competition similarly when using alternative 
measures of competition. This is an interesting result. While for-profit and nonprofit 
MFIs have different objectives, the results suggest that both types of MFIs follow 
similar strategies in response to competition. This may not come as a surprise given 
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 10  (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Time-invariant endogenous variables
 NBFI − 0.0195
(0.0362)
Other 0.910
(1.710)
EECA 0.0201
(0.0379)
 EECA − 0.00700
(0.0644)
EECA − 0.0543
(0.117)
LAC 0.124***
(0.0200)
 LAC 0.125***
(0.0461)
LAC 0.0973
(0.0776)
EAP 0.142
(0.106)
 Ceiling − 0.0752
(0.0720)
Ceiling − 0.0273
(0.0534)
 Constant 0.1153
(0.07170)
Constant 0.0328
(0.0746)
Constant 0.0888***
(0.0292)
sigma_u 0.1201 sigma_u 0.1632 sigma_u 0.1086
sigma_e 0.0577 sigma_e 0.0592 sigma_e 0.0529
rho 0.8122 Rho 0.8836 rho 0.8083
Wald Chi2
(p value)
1114.17
(0.0000)
Wald Chi2
(p value)
917.99
(0.0000)
Wald Chi2
(p value)
998.94
(0.0000)
Sargan–Hansen 0.0000 Sargan–Hansen 0.0000 Sargan–Hansen
(p value)
4.381
(0.3569)
MFIs 1327 MFIs 1183 MFIs 997
N 6172 N 5274 N 4199
14 However, a high Lerner Index does not necessarily mean the MFI in question is exercising market 
power. Prices may exceed marginal costs for a number of reasons. For example, some MFIs may raise 
prices considerably above marginal costs to cover high fixed costs.
15 Interest rates and competition can be affected by omitted variables that fixed effects cannot fully 
account for such as lagged interest rate. The empirical results show that the impact the lagged inter-
est rate is positive and statistically significant. The main findings do not change after including lagged 
interest rates. The inclusion of the lagged interest rate, however, leads a sharp decrease in the number of 
observations by more than 1000. We therefore omitted this variable from the analysis.
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that lower interest rates allow both types of MFIs to reach more borrowers in pur-
suit of their objectives. Nonprofit MFIs may operate in a variety of settings, some 
involving competition with other nonprofit MFIs and some involving competition 
with for-profit MFIs. Services provided by for-profit and nonprofit MFIs can be con-
sidered as substitutes, which may influence both the interest rate that nonprofit MFIs 
charge and their appeal to donors. Available substitutes may lead nonprofit MFIs 
to reduce their operating expenses and interest rates. Nonprofit MFIs may vie with 
each other for socially oriented donors and reputation through the provision of credit 
to the poorest populations at concessional rates.
Unlike Vogelgesang (2003), McIntosh and Wydick (2005), McIntosh et  al. 
(2005), and Assefa et al. (2013) the overall evidence of this paper follows the pre-
diction of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The results suggest that 
competition reduces interest rates and that competition has no impact on various 
measures of default. If competition increases default, then interest rates will rise 
accordingly and profit margins will remain steady or even rise depending on the 
response of interest rates to default rates.
To test the impact of competition on default, three measures of default were 
obtained from the MIX Market for each MFI: portfolio at risk of more than 30 days, 
portfolio at risk of more than 90 days, and the write-off ratio. The estimates show 
that none of the three measures of competition are associated with higher default 
rates. To test the impact of competition on profit margins, we replaced interest 
rates with profit margin, net operating income compared to financial revenue, as 
the dependent variable in the regression analysis and the results show evidence that 
competition reduces profit margins, particularly for the Lerner Index. The under-
lying mechanism behind these results should be pellucid. Lower concentration 
in the microfinance industry leads to less monopolistic behaviour, which leads to 
lower interest rates and profit margins.16 Unlike the findings of Mersland and Strøm 
(2009), Roberts (2013) and Baquero et  al. (2018), this paper’s measures of com-
petition yield intuitive and consistent results suggesting that competition may miti-
gate the problems of market power and offer borrowers microcredit at lower interest 
rates.
But do these findings depart from the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
for nonprofit MFIs? The answer is yes if the only social goal of nonprofit MFIs is 
to provide credit at low interest rates. However, in addition to low interest rates, 
nonprofit MFIs also focus on additional social goals such as serving more women 
and reaching poorer clients (D’Espallier et  al. 2013a, b, 2016; Al-Azzam 2019). 
Achieving these social goals simultaneously is challenging. While the interest rate 
offered and the percentage of women borrowers are straightforward to measure, 
reaching poorer clients is commonly measured through loan size per borrower draw-
ing on the intuition that poorer borrowers tend to take smaller loans. Providing small 
loans (social objective) is costly and interest rates will rise consequently. Similarly, 
there is evidence that women face higher collateral requirements, receive smaller 
16 The results of these regressions are not shown in this paper.
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loans, and therefore pay higher interest rates (Fletschner 2009; Bellucci et al. 2010; 
Agier and Szafarz 2013).
Table 11 provides a summary of the interest rates, the percentage of female bor-
rowers, and the average loan size per borrower relative to GNI per capita according 
the status of the MFI. On the aggregate and relative to for-profit MFIs, nonprofit 
MFIs charge lower interest rates, serve more women, and reach poorer borrowers. 
Among all types of MFIs, NGOs, registered as nonprofit MFIs, serve the greatest 
percentage of women and reach the poorest clients but charge relatively higher inter-
est rates. Among all types of MFIs, cooperatives and credit union MFIs, registered 
as nonprofit MFIs, serve the lowest percentage of women and reach relatively few 
of the poorest borrowers, which enable them to charge the lowest interest rates. 
Banks, registered as for-profit MFIs, have a similar outlook as cooperatives and 
credit unions; they serve fewer women, reach far fewer of the poorest borrowers, and 
charge relatively low interest rates. Nonprofit MFIs with more monopoly power may 
achieve their social goals by serving more women and reaching poorer clients, both 
of which necessitate higher interest rates.
Should the strong relationship between competition and microcredit interest rates 
be interpreted as a causal effect of competition? While reverse causality cannot be 
ruled out, it is likely to be implausible. First, competition and interest rates would 
be interdependent if all MFIs were for-profit. Competition affects interest rates, 
and interest rates affect competition due to entry. In this case, endogeneity would 
be a serious concern. In the data sample, however, nonprofit MFIs make up 59% 
of all MFIs. Since the goal of nonprofit MFIs is mainly poverty alleviation, their 
entry would not be based on the level of the presiding interest rates. In this case, the 
impact of interest rates on competition through entry would be implausible.
Tables 7 and 8 test the impact of competition on interest rates for both for-
profit MFIs (Table 7) and nonprofit MFIs (Table 8). The results from Table 8, 
where reverse causality is highly unlikely, are similar to those in Table  7. 
This suggests that the potential of simultaneity bias, while it cannot be ruled 
out, might be less concerning. Second, the literature has well acknowledged 
that competition in non-experimental studies is likely to be endogenous for 
the parameters of interest (Blundell et  al. 1999; Aghion et  al. 2018). Busso 
and Galiani (2019) provided the first randomised controlled field experiment 
Table 11  Social goals by MFI type
MFI status Obs. Interest rates Obs. Percentage of 
female borrowers
Obs. Average loan per bor-
rower/GNI per capita
For-profit 4761 0.25 4073 0.63 4609 0.2195
Nonprofit 5982 0.22 5337 0.67 5759 0.1658
NGO 3612 0.25 4553 0.77 4966 0.0905
CU 1636 0.17 1991 0.51 2334 0.3166
Bank 1302 0.19 1213 0.54 1489 0.3311
NBFI 3887 0.26 4656 0.62 5325 0.2038
RB 512 0.21 470 0.56 714 0.1666
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designed to assess the impact of increasing competition on prices of various 
goods in the Dominican Republic. They found that competition reduces prices 
and concluded that causality runs from competition to prices. Third, in the 
Hausman–Taylor estimates shown in Table 10, the Sargan–Hansen test of ove-
ridentification accepts the null assumption that the instruments set by the Haus-
man–Taylor estimator are exogenous.
Does a competitive microfinance industry enhance the welfare of borrow-
ers? As stressed by De Quid et  al. (2012), this question has been overlooked. 
The theoretical model of McIntosh and Wydick (2005) on the impact of com-
petition predicts an aggravation of the asymmetric information problem, which 
leads to multiple loan taking, over indebtedness of borrowers, and less favour-
able loan contracts for borrowers. This conclusion, however, has not been well 
documented in the empirical literature. An exception is McIntosh et al. (2005) 
who find that competition induces a deterioration in repayment performance and 
a decrease in saving deposits of the borrowers. But does this process lead to 
higher interest rates? The evidence, including this work, suggests that competi-
tion lowers interest rates. Lower interest rates would help businesses produce 
enough profit to pay interest, increase borrower’s income, accumulate assets 
and saving, repay on time, reduce the impact of adverse shocks, and enhance 
the overall well-being of the poor. The pool of the poor, however, may have 
less women borrowers and relatively wealthier clients. If the goal is to provide 
microcredit at lower interest rates, policymakers may consider enhancing the 
means for more competitive markets in microfinance, such as reducing the bar-
riers to entry and prohibiting monopolistic practices. In doing so, policymakers 
may also need to establish formal information-sharing mechanisms or similar 
measures if the undesired consequences of competition arise, including multiple 
loan taking and over-indebtedness.
6  Conclusion
The microfinance industry has uniquely evolved over the years into one where 
for-profit MFIs compete side by side with nonprofit MFIs to extend financial ser-
vices to the poor. According to the literature, this competition has led to multiple 
loan taking, over-indebtedness, and a higher probability of default. Higher rates 
of default would implicitly mean higher interest rates. The link between competi-
tion and interest rates, however, has not been well examined in the literature. The 
limited number of papers that link competition to interest rates have commonly 
deployed a single measure of competition finding inconclusive and (sometimes) 
counterintuitive results.
This paper uses three measures of competition to examine their impact on 
interest rates. These measures reflect three broad aspects of competition: geo-
graphical expansion, market concentration, and price markups. While the results 
for market concentration indicate that higher concentration is associated with 
higher interest rates, this impact is not consistently significant across all of the 
incantations we consider. Markups and geographical expansion, however, show a 
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pervasive and economically significant impact on interest rates across nearly all 
of the models we investigate. MFIs that have relatively more branch offices and/
or higher values of the Lerner Index tend to charge higher interest rates. This con-
clusion is true for both for-profit and nonprofit MFIs.
The literature has well documented the adverse impacts of competition on the 
performance of MFIs. On the other hand, the overall impact of competition on the 
well-being of the poor has not been well examined in the literature. This paper 
concludes that competition reduces interest rates. Lower interest rates, in conse-
quence, are an important element of the profitability of the micro-entrepreneurs 
and the well-being of their borrowers. The impacts of lower interest rates offered 
to the poor, however, need to be weighed against the adverse impacts of competi-
tion on other elements, such as over-indebtedness of borrowers, loan repayment, 
outreach, sustainability, and the financial health of MFIs. While the results of this 
paper do not provide clear answers to questions of how policymakers should exert 
influence on the domestic microfinance industry or which features of the appropri-
ate regulatory environment should be manipulated, they do suggest that policy-
makers should expect lower interest rates as a result of regulatory frameworks that 
enhance competition among the domestic MFIs. Policy makers should be cautious 
in evaluating the level of competition in the microfinance industry. Alternative 
measures of competition can be negatively correlated and popular measures, such 
as the Herfindahl Index, may not adequately capture the competitive environment 
that MFIs operate in, leading to poor information concerning monopolistic behav-
iour. If the goal is to reduce interest rates, the results of this paper call for policy 
makers to be proactive in seeking measures that lay the foundations for a more 
competitive microfinance industry and incorporating formal information-sharing 
mechanisms. Achieving this goal, however, may mean serving less women and 
reaching wealthier clients that what might be socially optimal.
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